Daniel P. Bolger Quotes.

1. "Afghan villages traditionally ran their own affairs, each valley a law unto itself. Afghanistan never enjoyed much of a central government."
- Daniel P. Bolger, Why We Lost: A General's Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars

2. "The Taliban cannot militarily defeat us—but we can defeat ourselves."
- Daniel P. Bolger, Why We Lost: A General's Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars

3. "He sent in a conventional force, admittedly just a few men from the Tenth Mountain Division. It reminded all that there were never enough SOF. Airpower had killed effectively in Qala-i-Jangi. After all the hammering, though, people had to go in on the ground with rifles, grenades, and guts. To control dirt and the societies that lived on it, you had to use live, trained, disciplined humans, and more than a few."
- Daniel P. Bolger, Why We Lost: A General's Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars

4. "It all amounted to the old British butcher-and-bolt tactic, done from the air."
- Daniel P. Bolger, Why We Lost: A General's Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars

5. "The U.S. troops joked that ISAF stood for I Suck at Fighting, I Saw Americans Fighting, or I Sunbathe at FOBs [forward operating bases]."
- Daniel P. Bolger, Why We Lost: A General's Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars

6. "Foes can choose to rely on international sympathies for the weak, to fan Americans’ moral qualms, to play for time, and so ride out air attacks."
- Daniel P. Bolger, Why We Lost: A General's Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars

7. "The Taliban probably found it all amusing, as the ignorant occupiers essentially provided their foes’ death benefits."
- Daniel P. Bolger, Why We Lost: A General's Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars

8. "Terrorizing you, he proclaimed, while you are carrying arms on our land, is a legitimate and morally demanded duty."
- Daniel P. Bolger, Why We Lost: A General's Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars

9. "Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril We failed on both counts. I know I sure did. As generals, we did not know our enemy—never pinned him down, never focused our efforts, and got all too good at making new opponents before we’d handled the old ones."
- Daniel P. Bolger, Why We Lost: A General's Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars

10. "In the West, military intelligence (MI) analysts have long followed a simple premise: Assess enemy capabilities, not intentions."
- Daniel P. Bolger, Why We Lost: A General's Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars

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