David Galula Quotes.

1. "To confine soldiers to purely military functions while urgent and vital tasks have to be done, and nobody else is available to undertake them, would be senseless. The soldier must then be prepared to become a propagandist, a social worker, a civil engineer, a schoolteacher, a nurse, a boy scout. But only for as long as he cannot be replaced, for it is better to entrust civilian tasks to civilians."
- David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice

2. "...to let the military direct the entire process...is so dangerous that it must be resisted at all costs."
- David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice

3. "Relying on luck, however, does not constitute a policy."
- David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice

4. "It may be useful to remember that a peacetime political machine is built essentially on patronage."
- David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice

5. "PROPAGANDA-A ONE-SIDED WEAPON The asymmetrical situation has important effects on propaganda. The insurgent, having no responsibility, is free to use every trick; if necessary, he can lie, cheat, exaggerate. He is not obliged to prove; he is judged by what he promises, not by what he does. Consequently, propaganda is a powerful weapon for him. With no positive policy but with good propaganda, the insurgent may still win. The counterinsurgent is tied to his responsibilities and to his past, and for him, facts speak louder than words. He is judged on what he does, not on what he says. If he lies, cheats, exaggerates, and does not prove, he may achieve some temporary successes, but at the price of being discredited for good. And he cannot cheat much unless his political structures are monolithic, for the legitimate opposition in his own camp would soon disclose his every psychological maneuver. For him, propaganda can be no more than a secondary weapon, valuable only if intended to inform and not to fool. A counterinsurgent can seldom cover bad or nonexistent policy with propaganda."
- David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice

6. "The counterinsurgent reaches a position of strength when his power is embedded in a political organization issuing from, and firmly supported by, the population."
- David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice

7. "In the conventional war, the aggressor who has prepared for it within the confines of his national territory, channeling his resources into the preparation, has much to gain by attacking suddenly with all his forces. The transition from peace to war is as abrupt as the state of the art allows; the first shock may be decisive. This is hardly possible in the revolutionary war because the aggressor-the insurgent-lacks sufficient strength at the outset. Indeed, years may sometimes pass before he has built up significant political, let alone military, power. So there is usually little or no first shock, little or no surprise, no possibility of an early decisive battle. In fact, the insurgent has no interest in producing a shock until he feels fully able to withstand the enemy's expected reaction. By delaying the moment when the insurgency appears as a serious challenge to the counterinsurgent, the insurgent delays the reaction. The delay may be further prolonged by exploiting the fact that the population realizes the danger even later than the counterinsurgent leadership."
- David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice

8. "The police. The eye and the arm of the government in all matters pertaining to internal order, the police are obviously a key factor in the early stages of an insurgency; they are the first counterinsurgent organization that has to be infiltrated and neutralized."
- David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice